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Commentary
Public Interest Practice in Practice:
The Law and Reality
By ANITA P. ARRIOLA*
and SIDNEY M. WOLINSKY**
At its best, the practice of public interest law is exciting, stimulat-
ing, and intensely rewarding. Public interest lawyers have reformed
and enforced laws concerning the social and economic welfare of the
poor, minorities, and other disadvantaged groups by pursuing major
litigation on their behalf. Due to the efforts of public interest attorneys,
welfare recipients cannot be removed from welfare rolls without a
hearing,' poor women can receive government-paid abortions in Cali-
fornia,2 handicapped children are entitled to an education appropriate
to their needs,3 landlords cannot refuse to rent to families with chil-
dren,4 and children of illegal aliens cannot be excluded from schools.5
At its worst, public interest practice is frustrating and fraught with
institutional obstacles. Financial and personnel cutbacks in legal serv-
ices programs have virtually eliminated access to the courts for many
disadvantaged individuals and have discouraged law school graduates
* Law Fellow, Public Advocates, Inc. A.B., 1979, Smith College; J.D., 1982, Ge-
orgetown University Law Center.
** Attorney and Co-Founder, Public Advocates, Inc.; Visiting Lecturer, University of
California (Boalt Hall). B.A., 1958, Princeton University; LL.B., 1961, Yale Law School.
This Commentary was essentially a Public Advocates, Inc. project. The authors grate-
fully acknowledge the assistance of Angela Blackwell, Robert Gnaizda, Armando Menocal
III, Lois Salisbury, and Abby Cohen.
1. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
2. Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779,
172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
3. See Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
4. Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson, 30 Cal. 3d 721, 640 P.2d 115, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496
(1982).
5. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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from entering the public interest market.6 The present administration's
policy on appointments and congressional legislation has decimated
the power of traditional watchdogs such as state and federal attorneys
general and fair housing and employment commissions to enforce civil
rights laws.7 The absence of resources in public interest practice mini-
mizes the effect of the public interest movement in both the political
and legal processes. In addition, the number of people with a need for
these inexpensive or free legal services has burgeoned to unexpected
and overwhelming proportions.8
The dedication of this issue of the Hastings Law Journal to public
interest issues and practice tends to recognize public interest practice as
a thriving branch of law. In fact, the growth of public interest practice
has been stymied by formidable obstacles. This Commentary examines
some of the major obstacles to the effective practice of public interest
law. First, it discusses the role of law schools and their curricula. Sec-
ond, it analyzes the tendency of the bar to maintain the status quo
rather than to encourage innovation within the profession. Third, it
examines the absence of resources for public interest law generally. Al-
though this discussion by no means covers the problems exhaustively,
these particular factors illustrate both institutional and practical barri-
ers to a rewarding career in public interest law. Finally, the Commen-
tary explores how public interest law operates in practice by examining
some of the cases and strategies of one public interest law firm, Public
Advocates, Inc., in San Francisco.
6. L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1982, at 1, col. 3. The Reagan Administration succeeded in
cutting the Legal Services Corporation's budget from $320 million to $240 million. One
proposal by the President sought to discontinue funding for the Legal Services Corporation
altogether. Legal Services News, Mar. 9, 1982.
7. See, e.g., Trausch, Deregulation: Major Impact on Americans, S.F. Sunday Exam-
iner & Chron., Dec. 26, 1982, at A12. The article details staff and budget cuts of regulatory
agencies and the emphasis on rescinding or weakening existing regulations. For example,
the Agriculture Department rescinded a regulation requiring packers of mechanically
processed meat to call a bone a bone (it is now described as "calcium"). The Food and Drug
Administration rescinded a regulation requiring inserts about the side effects of tranquilizers
in 10 popularly used prescription drugs. Workers in hospitals or plants that make furniture,
chemicals, or antifreeze are exposed to the fertilizer and fumigant ethylene oxide, which
increases one's risk of cancer; despite intense pressure, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration has not moved to establish an emergency standard lowering permissible con-
centrations of this chemical in the workplace, saying only that it will study the problem for
the next two to five years.
8. Cf. S.F. Chron.. Dec. 4, 1982, at 1, col. 5, 12, col. 1 (citing record-setting rate of
unemployment among blue collar and white collar workers).
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The Role of Law Schools
What transpires in law school that causes many students who en-
tered with high ideals and goals of using their legal education for pub-
lic service to emerge drone-like three years later to "slave away" in a
corporate factory? One factor that contributes to this reverse metamor-
phosis, from butterfly to worm, is the subordination of self that occurs
in legal education. One law school dean compares law students to
slaves, suggesting that their "chains are forged, not of iron, but of the
magnetic force of money, status, and professional recognition and ac-
claim";9 he finds these modem-day vassals gripped by a "fear. . .not
of death but of failure."' 0 The structure of law school is authoritarian,
which prepares law students for authoritarian law firms. This structure
tends to instill notions of submissiveness and obedience in students:
they learn to subjugate themselves first to law professors and then to
firm partners.
Another major factor in this unfortunate metamorphosis is the law
school classroom which, like all classrooms, is a place for value incul-
cation. It is axiomatic that a decision to hire faculty with certain skills
and experience, to adopt a course as part of a curriculum, or to teach a
particular skill "involves, either implicitly or explicitly, a choice among
competing social policies . . . . What is taught and who teaches it is
bound to effectuate, favor or advance, to some degree, a particular so-
cial interest or policy." 1' Thus, as one author has observed, a decision
to teach a course in securities regulation tends to favor corporate clients
and a decision to give credit for a clinical course in sex discrimination
may serve the needs of low income women.' 2 Law schools have to deal
with the problem of striking a balance between courses that serve the
purpose of "pure" legal scholarship and those that serve clients more
directly. Among courses that are oriented toward clients' needs, a fur-
ther choice must be made among those serving different sectors of the
community. The law school must decide whether and to what degree
the needs of the poor, the middle class, small businesses, and corporate
conglomerates shall be met.
In general, law schools offer courses and programs that tend to
serve the business community and the social, political, and economic
status quo. Indeed, most lawyers are trained to and ultimately do serve
9. Bell, The Law Student as Slare, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1982, at 18.
10. Id
11. Bloustein, Social Responsibiliy, Public Policy, and the Law Schools, 55 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 385, 419 (1980).
12. Id.
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the interests of the corporate and business community and institutions
of wealth and power. 13 Law schools certainly have been less responsive
to the less "establishment" segments of society.
Yet, as educational institutions, and in particular as graduate
schools, law schools have an obligation to constantly analyze and
reevaluate society's changing and growing needs for different types of
legal representation and, indeed, to scrutinize the underlying assump-
tions upon which legal education is premised.' 4 When law school per-
sonnel undertake such self-scrutiny, however, they often do so within
very narrow confines and change comes slowly, if at all.' 5
One assumption, frequently analyzed but rarely abandoned, is the
notion that the traditional methodology of analyzing appellate court
opinions through casebooks and Socratic discussion in the classroom is
the best method to train students to "think like lawyers."' 16 This meth-
odology often stifles alternative or creative solutions to legal problems.
Under the case method, the law exists in decided cases as a largely
complete system.' The students' and teachers' task is primarily to
identify or "pigeonhole" rules or prescriptions and to describe their
logical relationships. The system discourages profound inquiry into
13. Nader, Crumbling of the Old Order. Law Schools and Law Firms, THE NEW RE-
PUBLIC, Oct. 11, 1969, at 20-21. Compare M. MELTSNER & P. SCHRAG. PUBLIC INTEREST
ADVOCACY: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 11 (1974) ("[sltudents justify a
choice of traditional corporate or government work by complaining that public interest
jobs-when available-do not provide careful training, suitable working conditions, fair
pay, or a high probability of promoting social change"), with Stevens, Two CheersJbr 18 70:
The American Law School, 5 PERSP. AM. HIST. 403, 532-34 (1971) (arguing that most attor-
neys are practitioners rather than policymakers and serve the middle class).
14. The Anglo-American tradition of legal study has incorporated two distinct but con-
flicting responsibilities or goals. One is to train lawyers and the other is to study law. The
former involves the acquisition of a skill; the latter involves the acquisition of knowledge.
The conflict arises because law schools fail to balance the values inherent in these two goals.
For instance, an emphasis on teaching skills rather than exploring the relationships among
law, justice, and the social system ignores inquiry into the nature ofjustice and fairness in
society. On the other hand, an emphasis on purely scholarly or academic pursuits ignores
issues of public concern and the use of law and law schools to define and change society's
goals. Bloustein, supra note 11, at 399-402.
15. See First, Competition in the Legal Education Industry (I), 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 311.
314 (1978) (concluding that the "elite-model law school" has created a "non-dynamic indus-
try, slow to change and short on innovation").
16. The case method of law study was introduced in the nineteenth century by Dean
Christopher Columbus Langdell; he stressed the studying, in historical progression, of cases
that illustrate the evolution of a particular doctrine to its present state. Of prime importance
in studying and teaching law was not obtaining practical legal experience but rather reading
and analyzing appellate opinions. C. LANGDELL, Preface to A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE
LAW OF CONTRACTS at i (1871).
17. Id. at vi.
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underlying data, ethics, or social policy.'
The case method also ignores development of certain skills that
are essential if students are to become responsible lawyers. There are
daily reports of disciplinary actions against lawyers for conduct ranging
from mismanagement of clients' funds to forgetting a hearing date. 19
Through instruction in the nuts-and-bolts of the law--drafting com-
plaints, negotiating settlements and counseling both real and simulated
clients in criminal, welfare rights, landlord-tenant, juvenile, complex
civil and civil rights cases-students can be and occasionally are given
firsthand experience in developing lawyering skills and a sense of eth-
ics. 20 Yet most law schools have resisted the full development and pro-
motion of clinical programs.21 Where such programs have been
adopted, they often are viewed with suspicion, perhaps because they
18. Critics of the Langdellian case method of study included Justice Holmes, see
Holmes, Book Review, 14 AM. L. REV. 233 (1880), and Judge Jerome Frank, see Frank, A
Pleafor Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303 (1947), both of whom stressed the study of
what courts do in practice and the actual contexts in which legal rights and obligations arise
and are enforced.
There is a body of respected and responsible opinion, expressed by philosophers like
H.L.A. Hart and, according to Hart, by judges like Holmes and Cardozo, that concludes that
"laws are incurably incomplete." H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 17, 29 (R. Dworkin ed. 1977). This school of thought
posits that cases that fall into open spaces in the law should be decided by considering social
goals and making choices among alternatives. See B. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDI-
CIAL PROCESS 102-15 (1921). Cf. Holmes, The Path ofthe Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 466-
68 (1897) (use of social value criteria in court decisions).
19. See, e.g., The Recorder, July 28, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Sept. 7, 1983, at 1, col. I.
20. See, e.g., Banzhaf, ,Aq Experiment in Legal Education: Student Clinical Team
Projects, reprinted in M. MELTSNER & P. SHRAG, supra note 13, at 60; see also Auerbach,
What has the Teaching ofLaw to do with Justice?, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (1978) (advocating
the teaching of clinical programs that invite reflection on the relationship between law and
justice).
21. See Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer Competency,
1977 B.Y.U. L. REv. 695, 964, 971-75. Hastings College of the Law itself was embroiled in a
controversy surrounding the institution of a Public Interest Law Program in Public Interest
Law Ass'n v. Hastings College of the Law, No. 762-385 (Cal. Super. Ct. request for dismissal
pursuant to settlement agreement filed Apr. 12, 1983).
Located in the heart of one of the most destitute areas of San Francisco, Hastings is
ideally situated to house a community legal clinic, thereby providing its students with inval-
uable legal training while rendering desperately needed legal services to the local commu-
nity. Yet the school refuses to acknowledge any professional obligation to provide these
services. For example, Hastings has completely ignored the recent scandal of local landlords
refusing to provide statutorily mandated heat for elderly and poor tenants in the vicinity.
See S.F. Chron., Dec. 14, 1982, at I, col. 1; Dec. 15, 1982, at 1, col. 6; Dec. 16, 1982, at 1, col.
4; Dec. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Dec. 18, 1982, at 1, ol. 2; Dec. 21, 1982, at 28, col. 5; Dec. 22,
1982, at 2, col. 4; Dec. 24, 1982, at 2, col. 5; Dec. 29, 1982, at 1, col. 1; Dec. 30, 1982, at 18,
col. 1. Student participants in a Hastings clinic could have helped ensure that the legal
rights of these tenants were protected.
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may be "heavily oriented toward solving urban social problems and
criticism of the traditional law school curriculum as a training ground
for the business community.
22
Traditional law school course offerings also reveal the basically
anti-intellectual nature of legal education. Extensive reading assign-
ments in non-legal literature are so rare as to be an oddity. An under-
standing of current events is hardly necessary; students can get through
most law schools with a grammar school child's knowledge of contem-
porary affairs. There is also minimal departure from the explication of
doctrine to explore the relation of law to other disciplines, such as polit-
ical theory. Similarly, real debate of alternative views of public or so-
cial policies underlying doctrines is limited. The traditional method of
teaching law can be deceptive because it leads law students to believe
that only those doctrines that are being taught are important in the
practice of law; it is frequently inadequate in that students are given
little opportunity to test or evaluate such doctrines or compare them
with other disciplines. In this regard, law schools are neither designed
to nor serve as training grounds where the nation's future lawyers are
challenged to consider the character and exigencies of their important
social role.
The Role of The Legal Community
The growth of public interest law as a branch of law has also been
stymied by the non-legitimizing attitude of some of the bar towards
public interest lawyers. The view remains that anyone who does not
follow the traditional pattern of getting into corporate law straight out
of law school may not be a first rate lawyer and that the work of public
interest attorneys is less sophisticated.23 The sources of this prejudice
are not entirely clear. Perhaps, in a society that equates success with
money, the absence of top salaries and fringe benefits carries the impli-
cation that the lesser paid lawyer is not as competent. 24 Also, many
members of the bar seem to assume that the skills and expertise devel-
oped in public interest practice are narrow and specialized, non-trans-
ferable to and unmarketable in other areas of legal practice.25 It may
also be a factor that public interest lawyers threaten to change the sta-
tus quo.26 Indeed, when representing disadvantaged groups against the
22. See Bloustein, supra note 11, at 413.





business community or the government, public interest lawyers may
attack the clients of corporate law firms. Finally, any group within an
occupation that has different views and goals from the majority is
bound to be regarded with some suspicion.
The bar's notion that traditional law firms can sufficiently correct
the imbalance between represented and underrepresented groups
through pro bono work is a myth.27 First, the firms are highly selective
in the types of cases that they choose to pursue pro bono.28 Second,
cases they select often afford little lasting relief to the underrepresented
because the work usually involves a case or two rather than ongoing
and substantial involvement with a social issue.29 Finally, and most
importantly, the amount of time and money expended for pro bono
cases is miniscule compared to the resources expended for traditional
cases.
3 0
Matters are made yet worse by the fact that the bar has been un-
able or unwilling to curb the escalating and prohibitive costs of legal
services. Attorneys may charge $200 per hour and more for their serv-
ices; depositions are billed at $75 per hour and more.3 1 At a time when
27. There was a time in the early 1970's when pro bono services represented not only a
sizeable resource for the support of public interest law, but also the hope that through the
institutionalization of such work within private law firms public interest law itself would be
institutionalized. See COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF
JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter cited as BALANCING THE SCALES] (discussing Cahn & Cahn,
Power to the People or the Profession?-The Public interest in Public Interest Law, 79 YALE
L.J. 1005, 1036 (1970)). "But as the 1970s progressed, the trend toward establishing new and
formal mechanisms for fostering public interest work ... within private law firms waned."
BALANCING THE SCALES, supra, at 303.
28. "[I]t is not infrequently discovered that, in certain specialized areas of law, all ex-
perts either have clients whose positions would be in conflict with that of a particular citizen
group, or the work requested is too complex and lengthy to be provided free or at a substan-
tial discount." BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 27, at 301.
29. In 1973-1974, Professor Joel Handler and his colleagues at the University of Wis-
consin Law School undertook an empirical study of the work that lawyers and law firms
perform pro bono. The report noted that such work fell largely into two categories: legal
services for the poor, without litigation, and, to a somewhat lesser extent, legal services for
civic groups. Moreover, these activities were largely supplements to public programs pro-
viding legal aid or criminal defense to the indigent. Finally, the report concluded that the
private practitioner did relatively little public interest work of a policy-related nature. Han-
dler, Hollingsworth, Erlanger & Ladinsky, The Public Interest Activities of Private Practice
Lawyers, 61 A.B.A. J. 1388, 1391 (1975).
30. Professor Handler's report, supra note 29, found that approximately 6% of the aver-
age lawyer's billable time, as reported by lawyers themselves, is devoted to pro bono work.
As for public interest work during non-billable time, the average of the entire bar was 27
hours per year; 38% of the lawyers in private practice reported they did no pro bono work
outside of billable hours. Id. at 1389.
31. In a recent speech that sketched a profile of a discovery abuser, a New York lawyer
with tongue in cheek outlined the possibilities for running up costs with interrogatories:
May/July 1983] PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE
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severe cutbacks in legal services have put impossible demands on legal
as well as community resources, and the need for legal representation
has also increased, there is a serious risk that justice will be available
only for the privileged few.32 Such an elite system will ensure the con-
tinued inaccessibility of the legal process for the vast majority of the
public.
It is not uncommon to have a set of interrogatories run 380 pages, containing 50
definitions with 2,800 questions including subparts. So that no one will mistake
your virility, you label these as First Set of Interrogatories. And you propound
them to every party in the case. Assuming it takes a bare minimum of 10 minutes
per question to answer at lawyers' fees of $50 an hour, it will cost one responding
party $22,800 to answer, and that's if you let your most junior associate work on it.
Copies cost 10 cents per page if you're lucky, so the Xerox bill to create one set
of answers and objections is about $400 per set. If you have 15 parties in the case
the arithmetic says it's $6,000 plus the lawyers' fees of $22,000 times 15--over
$300,000 total cost. You have not yet, of course, argued the inevitable motion to
compel further answers or your own motion for a protective order or responded to
the second or third set of interrogatories, or served your own, equally abusive set.
Lewin, A Plan to Limit Pretrial Work, N.Y. Times. Dec. 14, 1982, at 30, col. 3.
32. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 638-647 (West 1973 & Supp. 1982). the so-
called "rent-a-judge" statute. At a cost of $200 per hour for the judge, the wealthy can
secure quality justice expeditiously and secretly. According to some critics the statute cre-
ates a "quasi-private judicial system for the wealthy." Hager, Rent-a-Judge Use Examined.
Criticized, L.A. Times, Dec. 22, 1981, at 3, col. 1 (quoting California Chief Justice Rose
Bird). A majority of lawyers favor rent-a-judge and they have raised four primary points in
favor of the the system. The first is that it is hardly used. This is refuted both by the statis-
tics (more than 40 rent-a-judges in Los Angeles alone), and the bar's second major argument
that rent-a-judge will eliminate trial delay. At present, in Los Angeles alone, there are more
than 230,000 new superior court cases filed every year. Even assuming 500 rent-a-judge
cases a year (approximately five times the present level) and giving each a weight ten times
that of all other cases (due to the likelihood that rent-a-judge cases are likely to be more
complex). this could amount to only 5,000 cases, or what would constitute only two percent
of new filings annually. Therefore it could, at best, reduce court delay from 59 months to
58.5 months. In fact. 11,000 Los Angeles County Superior Court cases forced into arbitra-
tion during the year 1979-1980, according to all parties involved, had no significant impact
on unclogging the court. One source states that only 3,804 were put on the arbitration list b.V
court order and only 11,245 total were arbitrated in Los Angeles during that period. 1981
JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
CALIFORNIA COURTS 66 (1981).
The bar's third point is that rent-a-judge is similar to arbitration, and everyone favors
arbitration. However, if it is like arbitration, which is statutorily provided for in California
Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1280-1299, why is there a need for rent-a-judge? The reason
may be that the wealthy want the best of both worlds: arbitration-like conditions and the
unlimited right to appeal and tie into the public appellate process. The right of appeal in
arbitration is restricted. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1294 (West 1981).
The bar's fourth argument may be the most persuasive, depending on one's bias. It
argues that the wealthy have always had preferred status as to housing, education, transpor-
tation, and dining, so why not also in terms of the legal system? From the point of view of
consistency there is much merit to this argument. Those who have opposed rent-a-judge.
however, have never believed that our legal system sanctioned, or should sanction, any pref-
erences as to either the right to vote or to have access to the judicial system based on wealth.
(Vol. 34
The bar's refusal to provide adequate legal representation for the
disadvantaged undermines what little public interest legal work is be-
ing done. The staggering needs of the underrepresented overwhelm the
capacity of the relatively few lawyers available to work on their civil
legal problems. So long as the supply of lawyers for indigents and the
disadvantaged trails drastically behind demand, legal services lawyers
must engage in a variety of caseload limitation techniques such as re-
fusing to accept complex cases, restricting clients to limited residential
areas, periodically refusing all clients by closing the doors, and exclud-
ing classes of cases.
33
The bar's refusal to legitimize and systematically promote public
interest law34 has the practical effect of denying representation to per-
sons who are most in need of it and least able to pay for it. This denial
contravenes the fundamental duty of the profession to provide repre-
sentation to all:
35
[T]here is a responsibility on the bar to make legal services available
to those who need them. The maxim "privilege brings responsibil-
ity," can be expanded to read, exclusive privilege to render public
service brings responsibility to assure that the service is available to
those in need of it.
3 6
The Absence of Resources and the Example of the Legal
Services Corporation
To view the public interest movement in the narrow framework of
legal practice is to focus on only one small part of that movement.
Viewed in its entirety, the public interest movement is hampered in
every arena by a lack of resources.37 For example, public interest
33. Silver, The Imminent Failure of Legal Servicesfor the Poor: Why and How to Limit
Caseload, 46 U. DET. J. URBAN L. 217, 227-34 (1969).
34. Ironically, despite the prejudices of the bar and the substantial impediments to the
effective practice of public interest law, such public interest practice appears to serve as a
salve for the conscience of the bar. It is the authors' observation that the bar, when con-
fronted with public criticism that lawyers are nothing more than outrageously paid profes-
sional guns, points to public interest practice to show that powerless groups in society are
indeed benefitted by our legal system.
35. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (1979) (a lawyer
should assist the legal profession in fulfilling its duty to make legal counsel available); see
also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 320 (1968) ("It is not
only the right but the duty of the profession as a whole to utilize such methods as may be
developed to bring the services of its members to those who need them, so long as this can be
done ethically and with dignity.").
36. Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the Individual Law-
yer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 438, 443 (1965).
37. A study was conducted to determine the funding source for 86 public interest cen-
ters for the years 1972-1975.
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groups cannot finance the different and numerous types of litigation
required to challenge legislation that adversely affects the rights of dis-
advantaged groups, or that overturns in one fell swoop a hard-won
court victory. They also have minimal influence in the legislative arena
in comparison to those who have strong organized lobbyists or access
to inordinate amounts of political action committee funds. 38 Thus,
public interest clients have only a limited voice in the political decision-
making processes that affect their day-to-day lives.
Access to some legal representation is absolutely necessary for
democratic political rights to have any real meaning. The Legal Serv-
ices Corporation (LSC) is one organization that helps make equal ac-
cess to civil legal representation possible for those who cannot afford to
hire lawyers.39 The LSC is critically important to the elderly, disabled,
minorities, and the poor, all of whom generally cannot afford to hire
lawyers. The very lives of these individuals often depend upon their
Foundation grants and contributions from the public have been the leading sources
of income for public interest law, each accounting for 37 percent of all money
given to the 86 centers in the four years. . . . Funds from the government have
also been an important factor. Twenty-two percent of all income has come from
that source. Of the remaining income, one percent has come from court-awarded
attorneys' fees and three percent has come from other funding sources (such as
investment income, sales of publications, and reimbursed costs).
BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 27, at 96-97.
From 1972 through 1975, a total of $130.4 million was contributed to public interest
law-a figure that at first glance may seem large but is actually tiny compared to the S 10.938
billion in gross receipts for all legal services in 1972 alone. U.S. BUREAU OF CENSUS, 1972
CENSUS OF SELECTED SERVICES at Table 1 (1976). Although the funding of public interest
law centers has grown substantially over those years-from $25.8 million in 1972 to $40
million in 1975-total income of these groups compared to other kinds of tax-exempt, non-
profit organizations remains miniscule. For example, in 1974, public interest law centers
received $33.7 million, or less than .001% of the $50.86 billion received by non-profit chari-
table health and educational organizations that year and only .04% of the $80.6 billion re-
ceived by all private non-profit organizations. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON PRIVATE
PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS: GIVING IN AMERICA 35 (1975).
38. In 1974, "608 PACs contributed $12.5 million to congressional candidates: total
campaign spending that year was slightly less than $100 million. When final 1982 figures
are totalled, they are expected to show that more than 3,000 PACs contributed $80 million of
the roughly $300 million total candidate receipts." Cohen, The Growing Concern in Wash-
ington Over PACs, W. L.J., Winter 1982, at 4. The two largest PACs
were established in the late 1970s as major instruments of the political "new right."
They are the National Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC), run by
Terry Dolan, and the National Congressional Club, chaired by Sen. Jesse Helms.
R-N.C. Each spent roughly $10 million [during the 1981-82 election] cycle.
Id.
39. LEGAL SERVICES CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 1981 at 7 (1981) [herinafter cited as 1981
REPORT]. See also Wall St. J., Dec. 9, 1982, at 5 ("After all the derelictions of the LSC are




ability to protect themselves against myriad forms of discrimination in
employment, housing, education, and health care.
Although the LSC survived an attempt by the Reagan Administra-
tion in 1982 to abolish it, its already minimal budget was substantially
reduced, 40 restrictions were placed upon its lawyers, 4' and directors
were nominated who are hostile to its objectives.42 The result at the
local level has been a severe reduction of lawyers available to disad-
vantaged persons. Some local offices have shut down; others have
closed their doors to any new cases or have limited the type of cases
they will now handle.
43
Perhaps the major roadblock to securing funds for legal services is
the criticism of those who are in control of the pursestrings. For in-
stance, President Ronald Reagan once described legal services lawyers
as "a bunch of ideological ambulance chasers doing their own thing at
the expense of the poor who actually need help." 44 Similarly, Senator
Jeremiah Denton, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism, stated that "groups that produce propaganda, dis-
information, or 'legal assistance' may be even more dangerous than
those who actually throw the bombs." 45 These attacks are, as one edi-
torial noted, reminiscent of earlier attacks made upon progressive law-
yers throughout the years. For example, in 1946 the Attorney General
of the United States lashed out at trade unions, labor leaders, commu-
nists, and "revolutionary lawyers." He attacked those lawyers who
fought most actively for the liberty of people and expressed the convic-
tion "that our bar associations with a strong hand should take these too
40. See supra note 6.
41. 1981 REPORT, supra note 39, at 7.
42. Interviews with LSC Board nominees conducted by Steven Brault, staff attorney at
the Equal Justice Foundation, revealed that none of the original nominees recognized pov-
erty law as an area of expertise. Some confessed to knowing little about the LSC program,
and some revealed a low regard for the philosophy behind the LSC. The Tither, EQUAL
JUST. FOUND. NEWSLETTER, Apr.-June 1982.
43. IMPACT, Dec. 1981, at I.
San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance, for example, has closed its five
neighborhood offices, and now operates solely from the Market Street location.
Likewise, the Alameda County Legal Aid Society has closed two of its six local
offices.... Whereas SFNLAF in the past pursued a broad program which in-
cluded specialized units in women's litigation and other areas, its entire operation
[has been limited to] three specific areas: housing . . .welfare and family
law. . . . In nearly all [LSC] offices, family law sections have been eliminated,
except for emergency cases involving domestic violence or harrassment.
Id
44. L.A. Times, Sept. 30, 1982, pt. 5, at 1.
45. GUILD NOTES, Sept.-Oct. 1982, at 12.
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brilliant brothers of ours to the legal woodshed for a definite and well
deserved admonition.
'" 46
Although these attacks are ideologically based, they have a mate-
rial and detrimental impact on the funding and maintenance of legal
services for the underrepresented. The loss of legal services for these
persons leaves them no way to protect their rights.
The gap in legal representation created by the government's
budget cuts has not been filled by the private bar.47 Indeed, the private
bar's insufficient response to poor people's needs for civil legal repre-
sentation accounted in part for the creation of a federally funded legal
services agency in the first place.
48
Law schools have also largely failed to propose creative solutions
to the problems of sustaining and promoting the practice of public-
oriented law. Most schools have made no serious attempt to halt the
outrageous cutbacks in the Legal Services Corporation. Indeed, as the
Reagan Administration contemplated the destruction of the LSC, Has-
tings College of the Law honored presidential advisor Edwin Meese, a
long-time, vehement opponent of the LSC, by having him dedicate one
of the College's buildings.
Issues and Strategies of Public Interest Practice: The
Caseload of Public Advocates, Inc.
Public Advocates, Inc. is a non-profit, public interest law firm that
concentrates on issues of primary concern to the poor, racial minorities,
the elderly, women, and other legally underrepresented groups. Since
its establishment in 197 1, the firm has brought more than one hundred
class action suits and has represented more than seventy organizations,
including the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People, the League of United Latin American Citizens, the National
Organization for Women, and the Gray Panthers.
This section examines five cases representative of the law practice
of Public Advocates: Officers for Justice v. San Francisco Civil Service
Commission,49 Committee for Children's Television, Inc. v. General
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., NAT'L L.J., Dec. 6, 1982, at 6 (noting that while the legal aid lawyers'
strike in New York for a wage increase created severe logjams in the courts, several of the
city's private bar associations refused to handle the 70% of the criminal cases previously
handled by legal aid lawyers).
48. BALANCING THE SCALES, supra note 27, at 25-26.
49. 473 F. Supp. 801 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
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Foods Colp. ,50 Punikaia v. Clark,5 I County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard
Life Insurance Co. ,52 and Public Advocate's Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) Petition on Infant Formula Misuse. These cases demon-
strate some of the procedural and substantive obstacles inherent in
public interest litigation.
Officers for Justice v. San Francisco Civil Service Commission (OFJ)
The OFJ suit was filed in April 1973 by Public Advocates on be-
half of the Officers for Justice (OFJ), a predominantly black police of-
ficers' organization. The suit charged that city officials manipulated
police policies and physical and mental exams to effectively prevent
racial minorities and women from being hired and promoted.5 3 Plain-
tiffs sought class-wide relief, including declaratory and injunctive relief,
various affirmative remedial measures, class damages, costs, and attor-
neys' fees.5
4
The case gained support from the National Organization for Wo-
men, Chinese for Affirmative Action, and the League of United Latin
American Citizens. The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People joined the suit soon after it was fied, and the United
States Department of Justice filed a separate action that was merged
with the original suit for trial.
55
After years of winding their way through the courts,5 6 trial of the
discrimination issues began in November 1978. The trial was recessed
after two weeks to permit settlement negotiations and these negotia-
tions produced a consent decree that was approved by all parties and
50. No. 61056 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Mar. 30, 1982).
51. No. 82-4189 (9th Cir. Nov. 4, 1982).
52. 65 Hawaii 318, 653 P.2d 766 (1982), appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 1762 (1983),
53. Officers for Justice v. San Francisco Civil Serv. Comm'n, 473 F. Supp. 801, 803
(N.D. Cal. 1979).
54. Id. at 803-04.
55. Id.
56. In November of 1973, the district court issued a preliminary injunction barring the
use of discriminatory entrance and sergeant's promotional examinations and imposing a
quota of three minority applicants for every two non-minority applicants in hiring patrol
officers and a quota of one-for-one in permanent promotions to sergeant. 371 F. Supp. 1328
(N.D. Cal. 1973). In 1975, the court enjoined the use of the 5'6" minimum height require-
ment for Q-2 officers, imposed a temporary quota for hiring women to Q-2 positions, and
ordered that the physical agility test be scored and weighted so as not to discriminate against
women applicants. By then a new Q-2 exam had been developed whose overall impact on
minorities was acceptable, so the three-for-two entry level quota was dissolved. 395 F. Supp.
378 (N.D. Cal. 1975). In 1977 the one-for-four quota was extended to the temporary ap-
pointment of sergeants. 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 7548 (N.D. Cal. 1977). However, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stayed that order pending its appeal.
The use of a discriminatory Q-35 assistant inspector's exam was also enjoined. Id. at l 7549.
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submitted to the district court on January 25, 1979. On March 30,
1979, the district court found the settlement to be "a just, fair and rea-
sonable resolution of this action." 57 The consent decree secured an af-
firmative action hiring program within the San Francisco Police
Department that required hiring a minimum of fifty percent minorities
and twenty percent women for at least a ten-year period.5 8 Despite this
seemingly major victory, various provisions of the consent decree are
still being litigated,59 and in all probability they will continue to be
litigated in years to come.
OFJ illustrates a few problems that are inherent in public interest
litigation. One problem is that, despite a legal victory, the primary
objectives of the lawsuit may not be realized. Even after nine years of
litigation, there are still no black captains in the San Francisco Police
Department and only two black lieutenants. 60 Another problem is the
incredible length and cost of the litigation, which has produced no real
relief for the plaintiffs. 6' Finally, OFJ demonstrates the effect of fac-
57. Officers for Justice v. San Francisco Civil Serv. Comm'n, 473 F. Supp. at 808.
58. Id at 814. The decree required the city, inter alia, to promote all of the persons on
the 1977 Sergeant and Assistant Inspector eligibility lists by January 1981 and to delay the
next examination for promotion to Lieutenant until the new Sergeants would be eligible to
take that examination. Id. at 814-15. To insure continuing promotional opportunities, the
consent decree also required that the city make a specified number of promotions to the
ranks of Sergeant and Assistant Inspector annually after August 1, 1981. Id. at 815. Ac-
cordingly, by operation of that provision, 25 Sergeant promotions and 15 Assistant Inspec-
tors were to be made each year after August 1, 1981. The city is further required to develop
new, valid promotional examinations, and to conduct promotional training classes before
any promotional examinations can be conducted. Id. Finally, the decree obligated the city
to engage in sufficient recruitment efforts to meet those goals and to modify its police officer
selection procedures in certain respects. Id. at 812. To assure compliance with the decree.
the parties agreed that the court would retain jurisdiction over the decree for ten years "for
the purposes of effectuating the purposes and terms of said decree and providing for enforce-
ment thereof." Id. at 820.
59. In the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the Of-
ficers for Justice challenged the city's proposed 79% cutoff score for Phase I of the Police
Lieutenants' Examination. Officers for Justice v. San Francisco Civil Serv. Comm'm, Nos.
C-73-0656, C-77-2884 (consolidated) (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 1982). The Ninth Circuit dis-
missed an appeal, filed by the intervening Police Officers Association of the district judge's
order requiring that the consent decree entry level goals for Sergeants and Assistant Inspec-
tors be met. Officers for Justice v. San Francisco Civil Service Comm'n, No. 82-4346 (con-
solidated) (9th Cir. memorandum decision dated Sept. 17, 1982).
60. Yearly Sworn Update by Race and Ethnicity, issued by the San Francisco Police
Dep't Personnel Office, Dec. 1982.
61. A separate battle between the parties involved the issue of attorneys' fees for Public
Advocates. Attorneys at Public Advocates put in at least 7300 hours on the case and have
spent in excess of 1500 hours monitoring provisions of the settlement. At one point, the
issue of attorneys' fees threatened to become more complex than the underlying discrmina-
tion suit. Attorneys' fees were finally awarded under the terms of the consent decree. Of-
ficers for Justice v. San Francisco Civil Serv. Comm'n, 473 F. Supp. at 820.
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tors beyond the control of the plaintiffs that materially impede resolu-
tion of the litigation: the monetary settlement of the suit62 has been
delayed in its effectiveness by the lack of adequate funding for the po-
lice department. Contrary to the terms of the consent decree, the city
has failed to provide adequate funding for the department's minority
recruitment program and the scholarship fund for minorities. This in
turn has led to an extension of the recruitment time and further delay
in the selection and promotion of minorities.6 3 Whether the goals of
the consent decree will ever be met is a question not likely to be re-
solved in the near future. Meanwhile, in a city that boasts of its ethnic
and cultural diversity, the membership of the police department re-
mains largely white and male.64
Committee for Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.
(General Foods)
In the General Foods case,65 Public Advocates instituted a con-
sumer fraud action in California Superior Court on behalf of children
and their parents against General Foods to prevent deceptive advertis-
ing directed towards children. The action arose out of allegedly false
claims by General Foods regarding five breakfast products. 66 The
plaintiffs charged that General Foods promotes these products as a nu-
tritious grain breakfast for children by deceptive techniques and false
statements about both the products and what the products do. Specifi-
cally, the complaint alleged the following instances of fraud in General
Foods' advertising campaign: there is no honey in "Honeycomb," al-
though defendants represent that there is;67 there is no fruit in "Fruity
Pebbles"; 68 sweet taste does not ensure nutritional merit;69 "cereal" is a
62. Provisions for monetary relief under the consent decree are reported at id. at 817,
818, 824.
63. Memorandum of National Trives, Auditor-Monitor of Consent Decree to Chief
Judge Robert F. Peckham, Sept. 1, 1981, attached as Exhibit A to Appellees' Brief in Oppo-
sition to Opening Brief of Intervenors and Appellant Police Officers Association, Officers for
Justice v. San Francisco Civil Serv. Comm'n, No. 82-4079 (consolidated) (9th Cir. filed June
11, 1982).
64. See S.F. Chron., Apr. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2, at 4, col. I.
65. No. 61056 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Mar. 30, 1982).
66. The products are "Cocoa Pebbles," "Fruity Pebbles" ("at least 50% sugar"), "Hon-
eycomb" ("at least 42% sugar"), "Alpha Bits" ("at least 38% sugar"), and "Sugar Crisp" ("at
least 43% sugar"). Appellant's Opening Brief at 4, Committee for Children's Television, Inc.
v. General Foods Corp., No. 61056 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., filed Mar. 30, 1982).
67. Record at 1061, Committee for Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp.,
No. 61056 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Mar. 30, 1982).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1055.
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grain, not a mixture of sugar and chemicals; 70 large amounts of choco-
late are not good for children to eat for breakfast;71 these candy
breakfasts are not "the most important part of a balanced breakfast";
72
and eating "Honeycomb" will not make a child bigger or stronger.
73
The original complaint was filed by plaintiffs on June 30, 1977. A
lawyers' pleading game followed. The defendants repeatedly de-
murred for failure to state a cause of action, resulting in the filing of
four amended complaints by plaintiffs.74 The defendant's final demur-
rer was sustained on July 27, 1979,75 and plaintiffs' entire case was dis-
missed. The California Court of Appeal, clearly hostile to the entire
concept of the case, affirmed. 76 The appellate court held, inter alia, that
the complaint contained "mere conclusionary allegations"' 77 and that
specificity required setting forth every single time the ads were aired
and the channel on which they were aired. 78 Because plaintiffs alleged
that every ad for each of the five products was fraudulent and that the
basis of the allegation of fraud was the ongoing, saturation advertising
campaign using hundreds of commercials, this was an impossible bur-
den. In effect, it would have necessitated amending the complaint
every time an ad was broadcast.
Thus, at a time when courts favor the liberal construction of plead-
ings,79 four and one half years have passed since the filing of General
Foods and the suit never moved past the demurrer stage. By the time
GeneralFoods goes to trial, if it ever does, a generation of children will
have been subject to these allegedly fraudulent and harmful commer-
cials. Children who were fourth graders when the case began are now
teenagers whose eating habits may well have been influenced by these
commercials. The case illustrates the inadequacies of litigation, espe-
cially when brought against a wealthy defendant that is represented by
a large corporate law firm. For them, litigation, time, and legal fees are
70. Id. at 1054, 1058.
71. Id. at 1056.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1055.
74. Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint was filed on August 19, 1977; the Second on
March 23, 1978; the Third on September 21, 1978; and the Fourth on May 15, 1979.
75. No. CA000429 (Cal. Super. Ct., Los Angeles County, filed July 27, 1979).
76. Committee for Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., No. 61056. slip
op. (Cal. Ct. App., 2d Dist., Mar. 30, 1982).
77. Id. at 9.
78. Id. at 10. The case is now pending before the California Supreme Court.
79. See, e.g., Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181-82 (1962):seealso J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.02 (2d ed. 1976) (rules on pleadings emphasize that pleadings are
not an end in themselves, but only a means to the proper presentation of a case).
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not of paramount concern, as long as revenues are maintained. In fact,
it has been the experience of Public Advocates that one of the primary
tactics of large corporate defendants is to engage in lengthy and costly
litigation in an effort to discourage or impoverish public interest
plaintiffs.
Punikaia v. Clark (Hale Mohala)
Judicial recalcitrance is another obstacle to the vindication of un-
popular rights. Local political pressures and ingrained stereotypical
thinking often result in the persistence of legally erroneous rulings,
notwithstanding higher court pronouncements to the contrary. This
has been exemplified in the Hale Mohau 80 case, in which Public Advo-
cates represented Hansen's Disease (leprosy) patients in their struggle
to retain their home at Hale Mohalu, an eleven-acre residential facility
on the island of Oahu."'
In 1978, the State of Hawaii cut off, without any court order, all
utilities, food services, and medical assistance at Hale Mohalu in order
to coerce the leprosy patients to leave. On September 5, 1978, those
patients filed a complaint in federal court and a temporary restraining
order was entered compelling the state to restore all services. 82 On Sep-
tember 21, 1978, a federal district court denied the plaintiffs' motion for
a preliminary injunction and dismissed their complaint for lack of
standing and for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted.83 The plaintiffs then appealed to the Ninth Circuit which re-
manded the case to ascertain whether the plaintiffs had an entitlement
80. Brede v. Director for Dep't of Health for Hawaii, 616 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1980).
81. The Hale Mohalu facility was originally established on federal land. The United
States, in return for a commitment by the State of Hawaii to provide care for the state's
leprosy sufferers, conveyed the land to the state, subject to a 21-year maintenance condition.
Despite the fact that Hawaii permitted the facility to deteriorate over the years, the federal
government did not utilize its right to require maintenance. On March 23, 1977, the mainte-
nance condition expired and Hawaii's title became a fee simple absolute. Shortly thereafter,
the state began proceedings to close the facility and move its residential and medical support
services to Leahi Hospital in Honolulu. A number of the facility's residents chose to remain
because of Hale Mohalu's residential facilities and its location allowing easy access to
friends and family. Over the last decade, advances in medical science have enabled physi-
cians to treat leprosy patients through outpatient services. As a result, the inpatient residents
remaining at Hale Mohalu were among the more elderly, afflicted, and crippled of the lep-
rosy population.
On January 26, 1978, the Hale Mohalu facility was officially closed. The state provided
water, electric power, telephone service, food, medical care, and supplies for the remaining
patients until September 1, 1978, when these services were terminated. Id. at 409-10.
82. Id. at 410.
83. Id.
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to services at Hale Mohalu and if so, whether any hearings necessary to
afford due process should be held.
84
On remand, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint and moved
for a preliminary injunction. The federal district judge denied that mo-
tion on July 28, 1980,85 and plaintiffs appealed that judgment to the
Ninth Circuit again. On November 27, 1981, the Ninth Circuit re-
manded the case to the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine whether the plaintiffs did in fact have a liberty or property
interest in the services at Hale Mohalu.
86
On the second remand, the plaintiffs moved for summary judg-
ment and for a preliminary injunction. Although the court indicated
that it would only rule on the motion for injunction and that it would
not consider the summary judgment motion, on March 5, 1982, the
court denied both motions, entered summary judgment for the defend-
ants without any evidentiary hearing, and dismissed plaintiffs' entire
case.87 And so it is that litigation continues for more than four years
after the state cut off services.
The March 5, 1982, opinion of the district court misconstrued the
rulings of the two prior appellate orders, chastized the appellate court
for misunderstanding the facts, and reinstated a holding that had al-
ready been overruled.88 In so doing, the judge put plaintiffs back to the
same position they were in before two successful appeals. For a plain-
tiff group composed of elderly people, such protracted litigation as a
result of lower court defiance of appellate rulings does not merely mean
a delay before rights are enjoyed. As a practical matter, it denies plain-
tiffs' rights altogether. 89
84. Id.
85. Brede v. Director for Dep't of Health for Hawaii, No. 78-0336 (D. Hawaii July 28.
1980).
86. Punikaia v. Yuen, No. 80-4433 (9th Cir. Nov. 27, 1981).
87. Punikaia v. Yuen, No. 78-0336 (D. Hawaii 1982) (order entering summary judg-
ment for defendants dated Mar. 5, 1982), a fdsub nom. Punikaia v. Clark. No. 82-4189, slip
op. (9th Cir. Sept. 7, 1983).
88. Id.
89. The Ninth Circuit recently affirmed the grant of summary judgment for the state by
the district court in its order of March 5, 1982. The circuit court held that the plaintiffs
possessed no legitimate entitlement to continued medical care and residence facilities at
Hale Mohalu based on the Hawaii statutes. Punikaia v. Clark, No. 82-4189, slip op. at 4308
(9th Cir. Sept. 7, 1983). In holding that the closing of Hale Mohalu did not amount to a
deprivation of plaintiffs' property interests by the state and that they were therefore not
entitled to a due process hearing, the Ninth Circuit stated that its decision was compelled by
O'Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Center, 447 U.S. 773 (1980), decided after Brede. In
O'Bannon, the Supreme Court held that a state's decertification of a private nursing home.
although resulting in the closure of the facility and the risk that its patients would suffer
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County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Lfe Insurance Co. (Nukolii)
In the Nukolii case, Public Advocates represented a large commu-
nity group that successfully halted the further construction of 150 resort
condominium units and a 350-room hotel on twenty-five acres of
oceanfront property on Hanamaulu, Kauai, known as Nukolii.90
When the property was purchased in 1974 it was originally subject to
the land use classification of open space and agriculture, but the de-
fendant developers, backed by substantial financial resources, obtained
an amendment of the zoning code from "open/agricultural' to "re-
sort." 91 Immediately thereafter, the Committee to Save Nukolii, a
broad-based coalition, commenced a referendum drive to reinstate the
open space zoning92 and obtained certification of the referendum.
93
Rather than waiting to see if the referendum would pass, the develop-
ers proceeded with construction and accelerated their efforts to obtain
building permits for the developments. 94 They succeeded in obtaining
a building permit for the condominiums on October 31, 1980, only four
days before the referendum vote.95 The building permit for construc-
tion of the hotel was issued on the eve of the referendum vote.
On November 4, 1980, the electorate approved a referendum to
repeal the resort zoning ordinance by a margin.of two to one. The
election results were certified by the county clerk on November 25,
1980.96 At that time, approximately seventy percent of the condomin-
ium structures and a part of the hotel building were completed. The
transfer trauma, did not amount to a deprivation of any interest in life, liberty, or property.
Id. at 784 n.16, 786-88. However, the Ninth Circuit noted that it had "specifically instructed
the district court to make a factual finding as to the transfer trauma phenomenon.. . and
the district court did not do so." Punikaia v. Clark, slip op. at 4309 (citations omitted).
From this it can be inferred that the district court had ignored the higher court's order and
that only the intervening Supreme Court decision obviated the need for yet another remand
for findings on the transfer trauma issue.
90. County of Kauai v. Pacific Standard Life Ins. Co., 65 Hawaii 318, 321, 653 P.2d
766, 770 (1982), appeal dismissed, 103 S. Ct. 1762 (1983).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. On January 30, 1980, the county clerk certified the referendum petition and the
referendum question was placed on the 1980 general election ballot. Id.
94. The Committee sought an injunction to prohibit construction of the structures, al-
leging the building permits were not validly issued. The circuit (trial) court denied the re-
quest for injunctive relief on September 5, 1980. Id. at 321-22, 653 P.2d at 770-71.
95. Although the developers received a Special Management Area (SMA) permit in
April 1980, final approval of the SMA permit was contingent on approval by the Depart-
ment of Health of the developers' sewage treatment plan (STP). Final approval of the STP
was given on October 31, 1980, and the SMA permit became valid on that date. .d. at 322,
653 P.2d at 771.
96. Id.
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county filed an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to
determine the relative legal rights and duties of the parties under the
referendum 97 and named the developers and the Committee as parties.
The circuit court granted the motion, finding first that certification of
the referendum petition did not suspend the zoning ordinance and that
all permits were validly issued. The court also concluded that in reli-
ance upon the existing zoning, the developers acquired vested rights to
continue and complete the condominium and hotel projects and that
the county was therefore equitably estopped from prohibiting
construction. 98
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed. The court held
that the developers had not met the good faith requirements under
principles of equitable zoning estoppel.99 The referendum was dis-
cussed three times in the special management permit decision of the
county; it was a pivotal provision in the loan agreement covering the
proposed condominium construction; and potential investors were
warned that their rights under a sales contract were subject to the refer-
endum results. 10° The county was therefore not equitably estopped
from enforcing the 1980 zoning referendum as applied to the devel-
oper's project. 10 1
Nukolii demonstrates how public interest lawyers can attain the
objectives of a lawsuit, but only when certain factors are present. In
this case, members of the community were extremely active, united,
and organized in their environmental concerns and in their opposition
to the resort development. More importantly, they were powerful ac-
tors in the process through the circulation and approval of the 1980
referendum. Such power (or, at least, expression of general community
concern), political or otherwise, is rarely possessed by public interest
clients. In Nukolil, the power of the community may have been the
decisive factor in the outcome of the litigation.
Apart from the precedential value of the cases, Nukolil and Hale
Mohalu, discussed above, also highlight the critical need for more pub-
lic interest lawyers in general. The absence of a single major public
interest law firm in Hawaii necessitated Public Advocates' involvement
in the case. One major deterrent to public interest practice on the is-
lands is the Hawaii Supreme Court's failure thus far to recognize vari-
97. Id. at 321, 653 P.2d at 770.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 328, 653 P.2d at 778.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 328-29, 653 P.2d at 779.
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ous theories to support awards of attorneys' fees. 10 2
Petition to Alleviate Domestic Infant Formula Misuse and Provide Informed
Feeding Choice
In another arena, a typical problem faced by public interest law-
yers is footdragging on the part of agency officials, notwithstanding the
urgency of the issue at hand and widespread popular support. One
example of this has been the response, or non-response, of the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) and the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) to a petition filed on June 17, 1981, by Public
Advocates on behalf of fourteen national organizations. The "Petition
to Alleviate Domestic Infant Formula Misuse and Provide Informed
Feeding Choice" 0 3 culminated more than a year of research, and doc-
umented the near epidemic misuse of infant formula among low in-
come families, the formula industry's role in discouraging informed
feeding choices, and the increased infant mortality and morbidity asso-
ciated with formula use.
Despite a FDA regulation mandating a response by the agency
within 180 days,'04 the FDA did not comply with the deadline of De-
cember 17, 1981. The petition did elicit a prompt response from the
industry: the elaborate response of the Infant Formula Council, written
by its lobbying and public relations arm, was both filled with industry-
generated data and filed within the time frame set out by agency re-
sponse. 0 -5 Repeated requests for agency action on the petition yielded
nothing until petitioners threatened legal action to compel a response.
Finally, on February 19, 1982, the FDA and DHHS issued a prelimi-
nary response which, while indicating broad areas of agreement with
petitioners, took no action other than to state that petitioner's recom-
mendations would be considered in the FDA's rulemaking proceed-
ing.'0 6 Further, the response indicated that review of the petition was
still ongoing; therefore, the agency's response was of an interim
nature. 107
102. See Shoemaker v. Takai, 561 P.2d 1286 (Hawaii 1977), where the Hawaii Supreme
Court adhered to "the traditional American rule that attorneys fees cannot be recovered as
damages or costs where not so provided by statute, stipulation or agreement." Id. at 1291.
103. National League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Schweiker, No. 81 P-0206 (F.D.A.
June 17, 1981).
104. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30(3)(2) (1982).
105. Infant Formula Council's Response to Public Advocates Petition Concerning In-
fant Formula and Informed Feeding Choice, filed Nov. 19, 1981.




Petitioners immediately responded, setting a deadline for the
agency to elaborate on its plan to meet the objectives that it had agreed
with petitioner were essential. Three months later, DHHS responded,
clarifying its position, providing some information on its current activi-
ties and plans but in effect indicating that the petition and related
materials were still under review. 10 8 And so it is that almost two years
after the filing of the petition, low income women continue to be denied
the right to make informed feeding choices, and infants of low income
families continue to be subjected to the risk of increased mortality and
morbidity.
Beyond Litigation
As the foregoing cases suggest, judicial and administrative forums
may not be the pivotal places for the practice of public interest law.
Public Advocates has attempted to reform and enforce the laws for
their clients and others in more direct, political ways. Public Advocates
recently issued a 100-page report entitled "Trust Betrayed, Hope De-
nied"'10 9 on the status of disabled persons in the United States. The
document detailed the Reagan Administration's unprecedented attack
on the rights of persons with disabilities through severe financial cut-
backs in the areas of education, housing, job training, medical treat-
ment, transportation, and legal services. The purpose of the report, 500
copies of which were issued to community groups, legislators, and the
media, was to document the harsh consequences and negative eco-
nomic effects of the present administration's cutbacks in vital pro-
grams. Such a report can be an effective method of informing the
public and those in a position to influence decision making about the
rights of disadvantaged groups and the shortsighted and unfair effects
of governmental policies.
Conclusion
The practice of public interest law is not unlike the myth of Sisy-
phus, who was compelled to roll a stone to the top of a slope, the stone
always escaping him near the top and rolling down again. Likewise,
attempting to secure remedies for public interest clients often involves
legal victories, only to have real relief elude them. Additionally,
lengthy and costly litigation, judicial recalcitrance, powerless clients,
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and agency footdragging all constitute formidable obstacles to the at-
tainment of relief.
Compounding these problems is the present state of public interest
law, which worsens every day due to drastic cutbacks in legal services
and the consequent foreclosure of the public interest market to law
school graduates. The failure of law schools and the legal community
to address these problems can only result in an ever-increasing need for
legal representation and an ever-dwindling supply of public interest
lawyers. Unfortunately, the people who will suffer the most are those
who cannot afford legal services and whose very lives often depend
upon some legal representation to protect threatened rights. Until and
unless public interest practice becomes a recognized, viable and thriv-
ing branch of law, nurtured instead of minimized by the law schools,
and free from destructive financial and political attacks, equal access to
justice for all will not be realized.

